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RESULTS 
The article analyses the causes of the crisis in Eastern Asia, among them: liberalization of foreign exchange 
accounts, reduced possibilities of financial flows regulation, government intervention, growth of corruption, production 
and democratization. The article shows how the liberazation of foreign currency accounts and the low level of foreign 
currency reserves have created the conditions for the emergence of the crisis of a new type. 
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East Asian Growth Model. What is left 
of it after the crisis 
The sustained, rapid economic growth, structural 
transformation and industrialization were becoming 
a trademark of East Asian region from the 1980s to 
the mid 1990s. The region in question was 
perceived then as an economically uniform area and 
such perception was not degree unjustified by the 
actual situation. This phenomenon was also 
accompanied by certain intellectual framework, 
which essentially boiled down to an simplification 
of a kind, one attributing the same nature and 
background to the economic growth in an entire 
region. Hence, the tendency to use general and all-
inclusive terms such as, “Far East” “Pacific Asia”, 
“yen bloc”, tiger to mention just few of the 
expressions coined in relation to the more 
complicated phenomenon than vernacular used to 
described it implied. 
Of the eight highly performing East Asian 
economies (acronym HPAEs) World Bank had 
identified in its study “The East Asian Miracle”, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand as a model to be 
implemented by other developing countries. Even 
previously there had been studies (Yoshihara 1988) 
in which it was argued that South-East Asian 
economies implied certain ersatz Capitalism, 
because of the inferior position of the state and lack 
of significant success in establishing better 
technological potential. In 1997 in the study Jomoet 
al., there was another critique of Word Bank’s 
approach, related to the latter perception of South-
East Asian Economies as a paragons of economic 
virtue to be emulated by other states. 
High esteem, in which East Asian economies 
were held, disappeared with the coming of the East-
Asian crisis and financial turbulence of 1997-1998 
period. The highest degree of criticism was heaped 
on the problem of mutual relation between business 
sector and governmental institutions, previously 
regarded as the cornerstone of the economic success 
of the East Asia. These previously highly praised 
interconnections suddenly became to blame not only 
for the surfacing of the crisis itself but also for its 
depth. Such a line of thought is present in the 
studies conducted by Backman in 1999, by Clifford 
and Engardio in 2000, while works of Jomo in 1998, 
Furman and Stiglitz in 1998, Radlet and Sachs 1998, 
Krugman 1999 as well as Bhagwati 1998) attributed 
the crisis to the international financial liberalization 
and its effects of easily reversible international 
capital flows. The second set of analyses proved to 
be highly critical in evaluation of the IMF’s policy 
prescriptions and conditionalities blaming them for 
making the crises even more pronounced. 
I would like to present the case of four East 
Asian economies that were the main victims of the 
turbulence in 1997/1998. Among them were all so-
called second-tier newly industrializing countries, 
namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and South 
Korea that is newly industrialized economy. 
Meaning of success – the East Asian way 
Back in 1993 World Bank has presented its 
publication “The East Asian Miracle Study”, which 
constituted an attempt at explaining all the 
developments characteristic for East Asia in the 
period of over three decades to that date. Following 
the Asian crisis, the popularity of that document has 
been waning, and nowadays certain people at the 
World Bank would like to forget about that 
particular publication. Some analysts ascribe this 
document to the impulse coming from Japanese 
government’s representative on the World Bank’s 
board, who contrasted the situation in Asia with 
poor results of adjustment programs in other regions 
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According to the Japanese expert World Bank 
should learn from the experience of East Asian 
countries, which at the beginning of the 90’s decade 
had been posting rate of growth in excess of over 
6 per cent for at least 25 years. It was the Japanese 
government responsible for financing such a study. 
In the report, eight economies were identified as 
high-performing – Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (the last three 
forming so-called second-generation NICs). From 
the perspective of mathematical probability it has to 
be stated that likelihood of eight relatively 
contiguous economies growing at such a fast pace 
for a long time amounts to less then 1/60000. 
Publication of the report in question symbolized 
the World Bank’s transition from espousing neo-
liberalism (as in the decade of 1980s) to the less 
orthodox position - one recognizing the role of the 
state in the economic development. Further 
advances along this line of thinking are evident in 
the publication of 1997 World Development Report, 
in which authors lean more towards effective state 
than towards lessair-fair concept. 
In the report under discussion here, World Bank 
recognized 6 types of state intervention, that have 
important place in the development of East Asian 
countries. Of that types bank approved only 4, 
recognized as ones of a functional nature (ones 
serving to ameliorate the market’s deficiencies) and 
questioned the remaining two as being of strategic 
character and leading to distortions of market 
operations. 
Among the interventions, that met with the 
Bank’s approval were state activities aimed at: 
1. Ensuring macroeconomic discipline and 
balances. 
2. Providing both physical and social 
infrastructure. 
3. Providing good governance. 
4. Raising savings and investment rates. 
The East Asian crisis 
In spite of the presence of critical opinions on the 
economic developments in East Asia there had been 
not a single analysis containing prediction of what 
was about to happen in 1997 and 1998. A single 
work was lacking to analyze – in the scope of 
financial liberalization taking place across the globe 
– the growing role of foreign capital in that 
particular region. Jomo in 1998 affirmed that the 
leading position of foreign multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in manufacturing sector 
(particularly in hi-tech industries) made domestic 
capital subordinated to the strength and influence of 
financial capital regardless of the latter’s place of 
origin. The owners of that particular strain of 
capital, who established the system of mutually 
beneficial interrelations with the people who had 
influence in political matters. Such connections 
were later to be called “crony capitalism”, but such 
a term wasn’t in use until after the crisis had 
erupted. Financial circles of the region did not stand 
idly by, when threatened by financial liberalization, 
but sought for – and of course found – venues of 
benefiting from the process (via tapping into 
arbitrage opportunities and employing other 
mechanisms and techniques). 
The close cooperation taking place between 
financial and political circles served to promote 
liberalization of financial markets, though the 
process of such liberalization wasn’t completed 
fully due to certain differences of interests of 
domestic financial capital on one hand and 
international one on the other. Certain countries 
learned the historic lesson well – as exemplified by 
Malaysia where crisis in the banking sector that had 
taken place in the 1980s led to the establishment of 
systems of checks and balances (such as prudential 
regulations), while other countries e.g. Thailand 
haven’t created such safeguards. In both countries 
inflow of capital from abroad was needed to cover 
current account deficits, growing imports of 
consumer goods, fuel speculative activity on 
regional stock exchanges and boost output of the 
real estate sector. It can be argued that capital 
inflows were more instrumental in engineering 
bubbles in the prices of assets than in contributing 
greatly to the acceleration of GDP growth. The 
surfacing of the crisis, with all of its consequences, 
precipitated the bursting of the above-mentioned 
bubbles. 
How the disease spread? 
The Bank of Thailand decided – on July 2nd 
1997 – to float the national currency, and the bath 
had quickly lost in value. The decision to float was 
preceded by months of speculative attacks on that 
currency. Similar situation – decisions to float 
currencies – leading to falling of exchange rates was 
taken in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. In the 
months that followed currencies and stock prices in 
the region were under pressure from the panic 
driven outflow of short-term capital. After the 
withdrawal of the official support – the same fate 
was to befall Korean won, despite the country’s 
different economic structure, compared to the 
countries mentioned previously. Direct (attack on 
the Hong Kong dollar) or indirect (actions aimed at 
maintaining competitiveness against the devalued 
currencies) pressure mounted on majority of 
economies in East Asia. 
Up to date – there is no universally accepted line 
of explanations or even descriptions of the crisis, 
even that the business media and International 
Monetary Fund tell us otherwise. There was a 
debate in which IMF’s programs for the Republic of 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia were questioned and 
criticized. The crisis called into doubt the validity 
and universality of well-established economic 
theoretical frameworks and systems. Though 
financial media (dominated by western circles) 
ascribe the eruption of the crisis to the actions of 
“crony capitalists”, there is an agreement among 
analysts that we had witnessed a crisis of new type. 
The consensus starts to encompass increasing 
number of experts, that what started as a currency 
crisis quickly exacerbated and transformed into 
financial crisis, later on spilling over into the real 
economy through the reduced liquidity in the 
financial sector, inappropriate policy response and 
the significance of psychological factors. 
What goes up, must go down.  
Or is there any other way? 
Export driven industrialization had brought about 
rapid economic growth and structural changes in the 
mid 1980s. Later on the currency devaluation in all 
three South East (HPAE) countries and 
modifications of the regulatory framework made it 
attractive to establish production facilities in those 
countries, as well as elsewhere in South East Asia 
and in China. Industrialization, as described here, 
continued well into the 90s and was paralleled by 
higher dynamics of both manufacturing services and 
construction activities. For about a decade things 
were running smoothly as budgets were in 
surpluses, monetary expansion and inflation were 
generally modest (Table 1). Before the year of 1997 
all three South East Asian economies posted high 
and rising savings and investment rates, while high 
domestic savings were supplemented by savings 
coming from abroad. Until 1997/1998 budgets were 
in the black and unemployment was low. That 
observation doesn’t prove that economic 
fundamentals there were perfect. The rising 
coefficient ICOR (incremental capital output ratio) 
shown in the tables proves that before the crisis 
erupted investments had been less remunerative than 
previously. Financial system was conducive for 
“short-term” investments over more productive 
forms of investments (at the same time more risky 
ones) in the real sector comprising manufacturing 
and agriculture. Excessive growth of investments in 
non-tradeables led to widening of current account 
deficits. The link property – finance was the most 
visible in the case of Thailand, making that country 
prone to unavoidable deflation of the speculative 
bubble. 
Therefore – due to financial liberalization – 
acceleration in the rate of capital accumulation 
shifted towards increasingly unproductive activities 
(as foreigners controlled majority of the region’s 
internationally competitive industries). Thus in the 
mid 90s rapid growth of the 80s gave way to a 
number of macroeconomic dilemmas. Foreign 
Direct Investment and foreign debt – previously 
used to bridge the gap between savings and 
investments- led to outflows of investment income 
and in the 90’s it were the short-term capital inflows 
that increasingly financed the current account 
deficit. “Confidence building measures” were 
effective enough in inducing inflows of short-term 
capital, following periodic outflows, but such an 
approach wasn’t successful in solving long-term 
problems. In the 90’s foreign investment was having 
growing impact on the regional stock market. Such 
characteristics of foreign financial institutions as 
lack of complete information (limited transparency) 
and short-term time span of investment contributed 
highly to the spreading of the crisis. The decade of 
1990s witnessed growing debt of the private sector 
as well as increase in the foreign liabilities of 
commercial banks. Only a small part of lenders 
financed productive venues, while majority of 
foreign borrowings was secured by real property 
and stock. 
Another problem stemmed from the fact that 
borrowings in US dollars were invested in a way 
which did not generate foreign exchange (so-called 
“currency mismatch”). Simultaneously high share of 
foreign borrowings mentioned above was in the 
form of short-term loans used to finance mid and 
long – term projects. (such situation is called “term 
mismatch”). Bank of International Settlements 
calculated that more than 50 per cent of foreign debt 
incurred by commercial banks was in the form of 
short-term loans (figures range from 56 per cent for 
Malaysia to 68 per cent for The Republic of Korea). 
Growing foreign exchange risk made these 
economies increasingly vulnerable due to 
maintenance of currency pegs to the US dollar. 
Though the pegs themselves were not benefiting the 
economy, they were also responsible for large 
amounts of un-hedged borrowings made by the 
influential circles engaged in defending the pegs. 
Since export – oriented sectors in the South – East 
Asia were dominated by foreign units, there wasn’t 
strong enough domestic community able to 
effectively advocate either floating or depreciating 
South East Asian currencies. Majority of the central 
banks – especially from the mid 90’s on- did not 
allow their exchange rates to slide down, but such 
downward adjustment – if allowed than – would 
have reduced the severity of the subsequent crisis. 
Financial liberalization and its fruits 
Shortly before the crisis erupted Kaminski and 
Rinhart presented (in 1996) the study in which they 
had analyzed 71 cases of balance of payments crisis 
and 25 banking crisis from the period of 1970-1995. 
Studying correlations between those crises they 
found out that of the 25 balance of payments crises 
between 1970 and 1979, only 3 were associated 
with the banking crises. In the period of 1980-1995 
46 balance of payments crisis “coincided” with 22 
banking crises. Such a change was attributed, by the 
authors of the said publication, to effect of the 
process of liberalization, as the private lending spree 
ended up first in the banking crises and 
subsequently in a currency crises. 
According to Montes (1998) South East Asian 
turbulences were brought by liberalization of 
domestic financial system and by opening of the 
capital account. Subsequent study -by Carleton 
(2000) – of the 57 countries in the period of 1970-
1996 shows that currency crises were predated by 
inflationary economic policy and low volume of 
foreign reserves. However, since the probability of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand going 
through a currency crisis in 1997 was calculated by 
the author to amount to approximately 20 per cent, 
weak economic fundamentals are less of an 
explanation than the process of financial contagion. 
McKibbin and Montes assert (each of the two 
researches separately) that investor panic was the 
main culprit in spreading of the crisis and cronysm 
(no matter how repulsive it was) is not to blame. 
Sometimes the macroeconomic fundamentals, as 
Asia learned the hard way, are not sufficient 
safeguards against the crises and financial markets 
are driven not only by statistics but also by 
sentiments. It is interesting that back in 1995 more 
severe current account deficits did not spark a crisis. 
It is capital controls that make it difficult and 
costly to rapidly withdraw capital and many 
governments treat FDI differently than they treat 
portfolio capital, giving preferences to foreign direct 
investment. 
The competition taking place among foreign 
banks in the regions in the 90s resembled the 70s 
when the loans were offered to the third world 
countries and subsequently – next decade – resulted 
in the emergence of crises in those countries. 
The dominant paradigm among policy makers 
was to disregard the growth in the private debt, 
provided that public sector’s indebtedness was held 
in check. At the same time the region’s stock 
markets were attracting foreign investors, with the 
latter being indirectly encouraged by the World 
Bank to invest in those markets. But Malaysia 
hadn’t seen the evil coming and did not react 
properly to waves of speculations on the stock 
exchange there in 1993-1994 and later on in 1995. 
Simplistic perception of East Asia by fund 
managers, who saw the region as more uniform and 
integrated than it actually was, caused contagion 
effect. Currency speculators also contributed to the 
problem’s magnitude by reacting to forecasted 
market trends. 
Collapsing currencies caused assets’ prices to 
lose value leading in turn to the contagion’s 
disrespect for national borders. At the same time 
liberalization of the financial system allowed to 
make profits on the falling exchange rates – while 
another aspect of liberalization – this time of the 
capital account made it easier for foreign capital to 
flee. Thus the downwards adjustments of the 
overvalued currencies turned into collapse of these 
currencies and into deep bear market on the stock 
exchanges. 
Krugman (1998) asserts that the main differences 
between the developments in Asia and the 
conventional currency crises were as follows: 
 the absence of macroeconomic problems; 
 government had no reasons for resigning from 
the currency peg; 
 bursting of the speculative bubbles happened 
prior to the currency crisis; 
 key role was played by financial 
intermediaries; 
 the crisis turned out very severe in the absence 
of adverse shocks; 
 crisis spread very quickly from “the ground 
zero” (Thailand) to other countries, even to the 
economies showing little similarities to 
Thailand. 
Since the problem was rooted neither in the in 
the governmental actions nor in the macroeconomic 
fundamentals, traditional warning systems failed to 
predict the crush. 
Furman and Stigliz in their study of 1999 
compared economic downturns caused by financial 
crises with ones caused by inventory cycles and 
concluded that the latter type are decidedly less 
severe. Companies resort to high financial leverage 
and high volume of lending as increases in the 
prices of assets buttress financial stability. Growth 
in the number of insolvencies impacts the credit 
system, while unpredicted, significant hikes in 
interest rates may not only usher in financial crises, 
but also can lead to economic downturns, as value 
of banks’ assets shrinks and debt saddled companies 
go under. Authors conclude that in such a case 
adverse effects can linger pretty long after interest 
rates came down to more sensible level. 
Reversible capital flows – circulation of capital 
Such flows are increasingly becoming subject to 
discussion as a number one of suspects in the 
eruption of 1997-1998 crisis. The opinion – 
expressed among others by Jomo (1998) – that the 
regions national financial systems were not well 
prepared for international financial liberalization is 
becoming increasingly respected. 
Since majority of the financial systems hit by the 
crisis was more bank-centered than financial 
market-centered they were exposed to the sharp 
narrowing of possibilities to secure short-term debt 
because of the declining confidence in the region on 
the part of foreign financial circles. Foreign 
exchange reserves had turned out inadequate to 
cover payments due abroad, and governments were 
forced to search for provisional financing to finance 
debt incurred chiefly by the private sector. 
From the Bank of International Settlements’ data 
it can be inferred that banking sector was 
responsible for majority of short-term debt and its 
growth in the periods of soaring stock market prices 
indicates that much of the debt in question was 
caused by other factors than the credit expansion 
alone. 
Malaysia had curtailed the growth of such debt in 
1994 by introducing temporary capital controls, but 
in 1996 and at the beginning of 1997 situation 
deteriorated again as banks and large private firms 
were able -thanks to political influence – to 
disregard guidance given by the central bank. 
By the end mid – year of 1997 more than a half 
of foreign borrowings in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand was received by non-banking institutions 
of the private sector, while 65 per cent of such debt 
in Korea was incurred by banks (Table 3). 
The tables (Table 2) show the growth of foreign 
debt and the growth of FDI in the early and mid 
1990s. FDI growth was the lowest in case of the 
Republic of Korea, while the transfer of profits from 
this country was the lowest (contrary to Malaysia). 
At the same time portfolio capital posted high 
growth in all four countries. 
Another interesting measure – the relation of 
external debt to export revenues also has shown 
growth between 1995 and 1996 (from 112 to 120 
per cent in the case of Thailand and from 57 per cent 
to 42 per cent in the Republic of Korea, but declined 
in Indonesia). 
By 1996 foreign currency reserves of Indonesia 
amounted to 15 per cent of foreign debt while in the 
case of the Republic of Korea that coverage was at 
30 per cent, 43 per cent in Thailand and 70 per cent 
in Malaysia. By 1997 that ratio declined to 15 per 
cent in the Republic of Korea, 29 per cent in 
Thailand and 46 per cent in Malaysia as reserves 
were deployed, though unsuccessfully to defend the 
exchange rates of domestic currencies. Of the total 
external debt, the short term debt portion amounted 
to 58 per cent in the Republic of Korea, 41 per cent 
in Thailand, 28 per cent in Malaysia, and 25 per cent 
in Indonesia. Glance at the table 3 informs us that it 
were Japanese, German and French banks which led 
the way in lending to developing countries, while 
Anglo-American banks were less involved. Such 
breakdown of loans differs from the situation before 
the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
Malaysia was running current account deficits 
from the beginning of the decade and investments in 
non-tradeables there did not contribute to export 
earnings (there were also problems of previously 
mentioned “term mismatch”). 
According to Wong and Jomo (2001) in East 
Asia foreign capital served rather to supplement 
than to substitute domestic savings, though the 
nature of such capital was changing over time. 
Inflow of foreign capital allowed to finance 
additional imports but thus contributed to current 
account deficits. It can be also stipulated that 
excessive reliance on FDI in gross domestic capital 
investments had adversely affected domestic 
entrepreneurship and other economic capabilities of 
the countries (Jomo et.al 1997). 
Since mid-year of 1995) currency pegs started to 
adversely affect regions competitive position, 
because yen started to lose in value against US 
dollar. The speculative attacks on overvalued 
currencies forced the defense of bhat and ringitt 
(Malaysia). However, such actions failed to produce 
the desired results and did not stop the panic from 
erupting and spreading. Bursting of speculative 
bubbles in asset prices hit hard banking systems of 
the four countries, undermining liquidity of the 
financial systems and leading to recession. 
International financial liberalization led to 
temporary large net inflows of foreign capital to 
South East Asia, but FDI brought about weakening 
of domestic industrial companies and contributed to 
dominance of financial capital over economic 
policy. Before the crisis erupted, East Asia had 
experienced financial liberalization – one that had 
its roots back in the mid 80s – and the process 
resulted in popularity of both newly emerging stock 
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Анотація 
У статті проаналізовані причини кризи у Східній Азії, серед яких: лібералізація валютних 
рахунків, зменшення можливості управління фінансовими потоками, урядові втручання, ріст 
корупції, виробництва та демократії. Показано як лібералізація валютних рахунків та низький рівень 
резервів в іноземній валюті створили достатні умови виникнення кризи нового типу. 
 
